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ABSTRACT 
Talcott Parsons’ important legacy in the field of economic sociology still remains 
underestimated. The paper pays Parsons his due, without avoiding criticism. The paper focuses on his 
most mature work in this field, i.e. „Economy and Society”, co-authored with Neil Smelser. Many 
weaknesses in Parsonian approach are rooted in his methodological outlook, in particular his anti-
empricism that leads him to prefer conceptual methods over the facts, which preference, in turn, is 
responsible for many substantive omissions and errors Parsons commits. Nevertheless, some of his 
ideas, such as an input-output paradigm, or even his famous AGIl scheme have proved to be mor 
fruitful. Many critical points made by Parsons’ opponents are, therefore, found to be irrelevant or 
misplaced. This refers in particular to an interesting and innovative in a number of respects theory of 
money.  
 
Keywords: economic sociology; Parsons; AGIL; money; symbolic media; economy; methodological 
formalism 
 
 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Swedberg and Granovetter comment that ‘[Parsons] came to see sociology as focusing 
exclusively on the values, or ‘ends,’ in ‘means-end’ chains, with economists assigned to the 
task of analyzing the most efficient ways to achieve ends taken as given’ (1992: 5). This 
statement refers to what Parsons in his first major work, ‘The Structure of Social Action’ 
termed AN analytical factor view. Such an approach would rely on different points of view of 
economics and sociology, the first of which would consider alternative use of scarce resources 
to meet needs, while the second - would focus on values, i.e. fundamental common ends. 
By contrast, in co-authored with Neil Smelser ‘Economy and Society, economics is no 
longer recognized as a science equivalent or alternative to sociology but as a special case of a 
general theory of social system. 
 
 
 2.  BASIC PRINCIPLES 
 
The procedure Parsons adopted to analyze both the general system of action and its 
subsystems is called ‘the AGIL scheme’ or ‘AGIL paradigm’. To survive or maintain 
equilibrium with respect to its environment, any system must to some degree adapt to that 
environment, attain its goals, integrate its components, and maintain its latent pattern, a 
cultural template of some sort. These are called the system's functional imperatives. 
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To  put it in more specific terms: the 4 functional imperatives of any system of action, 
given in order of significance from the point of view of cybernetic control of action processes 
in the system under consideration are the following: 
L - The function of pattern maintenance. The function of pattern maintenance refers to the 
imperative of maintaining the stability of patterns of institutionalized culture defining the 
structure of the system. There are two distinct aspects of this function. The first concerns the 
character of the normative pattern itself; the focus lies in the structural category of values. The 
second concerns its state of institutionalization, which concerns the motivational commitment 
of the individual. A very central problem here is that of the socialization of the individual, 
taken as the processes by which the values of the society are internalized in an individual 
personality. Overall, systems do show a tendency to maintain themselves (inertia). 
G - The function of goal-attainment. Goal-attainment becomes a problem in so far as there 
arises some discrepancy between the inertial tendencies of the system and its needs resulting 
from interchange with the situation. A goal is therefore defined in terms of equilibrium, and 
directional changes will tend to minimize the discrepancy between the two systems. Goal -
attainment, or goal- orientation is thus, by contrast with pattern maintenance, tied to a specific 
situation. Systems often have a plurality of goals. For the social system as such, goal-
orientation concerns, therefore, not commitment to the values of the society, but motivation to 
contribute what is necessary for the functioning of the system. 
A - The function of adaptation. Adaptation is another consequence of goal plurality. A system 
has only so many set, scarce resources, and when goals are many, often one goal must be 
sacrificed so the resources may be used to attain another goal. this means that the system loses 
the benefits of the sacrificed goal. The sacrificed goal is chosen through the function of goal-
attainment. Adaptation is concerned with providing additional disposable facilities 
independent of their relevance to any particular goal. More generally, at the macroscopic 
level, goal-attainment is the focus of political organization, and adaptation is the focus of 
economic organization. Within a given system, goal-attainment is a more important control 
then is adaptation. 
I - The function of integration. In the control hierarchy, integration stands between the 
functions of pattern-maintenance and goal-attainment. The functional problem of integration 
concerns the mutual adjustments of segmented units or subsystems from the point of view of 
their contributions to the effective functioning of the system as a whole. In a highly 
differentiated society, the primary focus of the integrative mechanism is found in the system 
of legal norms and the associated legal system. The system as a whole is concerned most with 
the allocation of rights and obligations. For any given social system, the integrative function 
is the focus of its most distinctive properties and processes’ (Parsons 2007).  
 
In the case of the analysis of a societal action system, the AGIL Paradigm, according to 
Parsons, yields four interrelated and interpenetrating subsystems: the behavioral systems of its 
members (A), the personality systems of those members (G), the society as a system of social 
organization (I) and the cultural system of that society (L). To analyze a society as a social 
system (the I subsystem of action), it can be treated as a complex system of interrelated 
functional subsystems, namely: 
•  The economy -- societal adaptation to its action and non-action environmental systems 
•  The polity -- societal goal attainment 
•  The societal community -- the integration of its diverse social components 
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•  The fiduciary system -- processes and units that function to reproduce societal culture (also 
    called pattern maintenance and tension management).  
Parsons put forward the idea (to which we shall come back to analyse it in more detail) 
that each of these systems also developed some specialized symbolic mechanisms of 
interaction analogous to money in the economy, e.g., influence in the societal community. 
Various processes of ‘interchange’ among the subsystems of the societal system were 
postulated. For the notion of border exchanges implies that each subsystem requires input 
from the neighboring subsystems in order to continue functioning correctly. For example the 
economic subsystem requires input from the 'G' subsystem (external support from the state for 
businesses) the 'I' subsystem (legal norms regulating contracts) and the 'L' subsystem (value 
commitments internalised in economic actors). Within each subsystem itself there is another 
AGIL system – corporations (of the adaptive subsystem) contain within them positions 
specifically involved with internally regulating values (for example human resources 
departments) promulgating norms (the legal department), political organisation (board of 
directors) and adaptation to the environment. One might add that the said theory of subsystem 
interchanges is at the same time an attempt to incorporate the model of factors of production, 
i.e. capital, labour, land and organization. 
One cannot agree more with a diagnosis presented in the foreword to “Economy adnd, 
where mutually damaging effects of the divorce of economics and sociology are stressed, and, 
correspondingly, the need of integration of the two disciplines is proposed. One of the crucial 
reasons for this sad state of affairs consists of resignation of contemporary sociologists, some 
exceptions nothwistanding, from creating a general social theory. All the more interesting will 
be to check how Parsons and Smelser have succeeded in that regard. 
As has been said above, society is seen as composed of four basic functional 
subsystems. If indeed recently a renewed interest in the relationship between economics and 
sociology (Swedberg 1991; Smelser and Swedberg 1994) has been observed, this relation 
cannot be determined without raising another issue, that of conceiving the boundaries of the 
economy. Parsons ansers this question by pointing to objectives of the economy as a 
functional subsystem of society at large. Namely, he defines the economy’s function as one of 
production of consumer goods and services. 
Two comments are in order. Firstly, in the definition conspicuous by their absence are 
the means of production or investment goods. While they, of course, constitute an 
indispensable condition of reproduction of the economy, there has been no room for them 
within Parsonian scheme, as they are not subject of any interchange with any other societal 
system. As a result, Parsons’ notion is useless from the standpoint of economics (let us recall, 
a discipline with which he is seeking integration) as being of no help in constructing national 
balance, tables of reproduction such as those found in Marx’s writings, adequate schemes of 
flows of economic outputs and so on and so forth. It is also the second component of the 
definition that at least needs more precision. ‘Services’ is, after all, notoriously ambiguous 
term, and, if, as Parsons appears to be doing following in the footsteps of most economists, 
they are to be understood as all actions that satisfy other persons’ wants, there could be no 
reasons why not include in the economy activities of the clergy as satisfying the believers’ 
need for peace of mind and clear conscience, or police, or even, as Marx ironically noted, 
‘The criminal [who]produces an impression, partly moral and partly tragic, as the case may 
be, and in this way renders a ‘service’ by arousing the moral and aesthetic feelings of the 
public’(1861-3). thus conflating economic and non-economic activities. 
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The task of delineating the economic structure’s boundaries is not made any easier, but, 
on the contrary, further complicated by introducing by Parsons the notion of income as a 
purpose of functioning of the economy. 
Just like another claim of that sort according to which the key attribute of internal 
economic processes is measurement, monetary calculation it must be charged with 
ahistoricism, an attempt of viewing all various historical economic structures from an angle of 
merely one of such systems, i.e. commodity-money one whose most perfect embodiment is 
capitalism. Going forward, Parsonian functional analysis does not produce any useful insights 
either. Application of its categories leads to rather fuzzy contention to the effect that the 
economy is aimed at production of generalised facilities as means of a limitless number of 
uses, or, to put it differently, physical, social and cultural objects instrumental in solving 
adaptive problems of social systems.  
The concept of ‘utilities’ little relevance as regards our ‘demarcation’ purpose stems 
from the fact that this concept includes everything which contributes to achieving any 
purposes valued by a system or its subunits. It follows that the reader is almost completely 
free as far as recognition of a given object as a ‘generalised facility’ is concerned. 
The most grave flaw of Parsons’ conception of the economy is inclusion within it only 
some relations of commodity-money circulation. As a consequence, Parsons takes an odd 
decision of classifying banks, together with political parties, but also insurance companies etc. 
As political units.  
 
 
3.  THE ECONOMY VS. THE POLITY  
 
The above-mentioned financial institutions are, along with any , even individual, 
creditor part and parcel of the polity, because their function consists in providing capital, 
which, according to Parsons, is no more, no less political activity. Of course, these conceptual 
choices have no empirical grounds. To put it more precisely, despite the fact that the authors 
of the book are Americans, their view , paradoxically, is congruent not with an Anglo-Saxon 
model of capitalism, where corporate financing is based on the stock exchanges, but rather 
continental and Asiatic models where the financial role of banks is much more prominent. 
Anyway, financial institutions should, of course, to be treated as economic ones.  
It is to be noted that to exaggerate the significance of banks is to commit the so-called 
Hilferding error. This economist’s theory of financial capital has never, frankly speaking, 
strictly matched reality, and is even more outdated in relation to at least American economic 
system. The above considerations are closely associated with another misjudgment 
concerning the role of self-financing. Parsons, to be sure, perceives the existence of such 
source of corporate capital, but – surprise, surprise! – regards them as ‘special cases’, so 
definitely playing down their significance. When one supplements this position with an 
answer to the question on the causes of Parsonian stance, clear methodological conclusions 
follow. In point of fact, they have to do with a weak spot in his deductive methodology, to 
which issue we shall return later. Namely, as an output of the polity, as couched in terms of 
Parsonian theory of system interchanges is power, which term has something in common with 
‘purchasing power’, the whole conception becomes, in Parsons’ opinion, credible. This 
account, it has to be pointed out, departs from one presented in his earlier ‘The Structure of 
Social Action’ where the political sphere has been associated with extra-economic coercion. 
What has changed since that treatment is an adoption of the notion of interchanges, or 
an input-output analysis. In all probability it was precisely this perspective that has imposed 
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the solution mentioned above. Simply put, in a given place within the scheme a specific input 
or output has to be found. 
For ‘Parsons's treatment of empirical phenomena comes to be derived from the 
categories of a scheme that is itself held to be nonempirical. [Supposedly empirically-orinted 
categories] are all generated by the logic of the a priori categorical scheme; the ‘indefinite 
number of concrete empirical systems’ is not itself the basis for a reconsideration of types or 
the categories from which they are derived. The categories were not empirically derived and 
their ‘applications’ have no consequence for the theory. In this way, it proves all too easy for 
Parsons to assimilate all arguments to his general theory, that is, to a general argument about 
the progressive differentiation of social structures around specialized functions. 
Differentiation and functional specialization are argued to be integral to complex systems and 
their integration. At the same time, […] each interchange in the complex contributes to the 
interdependence of the system’ (Holmwood 2006). 
Parsons’ methodological position could be described as formalism. According to this 
position, contact with empirical data does not lead to modification, improvement or 
enrichment of the conceptual constructs previously worked out; it is as a matter of fact 
superflouos, or even undesirable and harmful, as it can violate logical coherence of the 
theoretical system, constructed without any reference to empirical facts. ‘Parsons committed 
himself to a form of analytical theorizing in which the mechanisms associated with the 
functioning of social structures are rendered non-empirical, thereby undermining economic 
sociology as an empirical research program’ (Holmwood 2006). 
It is this that accounts for so frequent in Parsons’ writings use of safety hatches of 
which the aforementioned ‘special case’ is a case in point. They help the American supporter 
of so-called Grand Theory avoid uncomfortable confrontation with reality, whilst maintaining 
prima facie integrity of his aprioristic schema and models. As Burger puts it, Parsons was so 
concerned with avoiding the problems of empiricism and the ‘fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness’ that he rendered his scheme unfalsifiable: 
‘the only thing that could be tested is the synthetic explanation of concrete phenomena by the 
combined totality of all the specialized sciences. Yet how can these sciences be developed to 
begin with if they are not testable?’ (1977: 328). 
Fortunately, there is silver lining to parsonian treatment of interrelations of , on the one 
hand, the economy, and the polity on the other. Namely, Parsons’ theory of interchanges 
allows to distinguish an input of the latter for the benefit of the former, which is termed 
‘supporting productive enterprises’. This general term involves such methods of the state 
intervention in the economic structure as protective tariffs, import restrictions, direct subsidies 
aiding various industries and others. 
However, Parsons uses overly broad categories: he speaks in this context both of 
nationalisation, and, on the other, of calls directed at the collective ‘Geist’ of enterprise, 
which make it difficult, if not impossible to distinguish qualitatively different ways of state 
economic interventions. Thus, from the viewpoint of Parsons, both a single armaments order 
and determination of minimal wage or regulation of prices in specific industries will be 
classified on the same footing. Meanwhile, all activities belonging to the latter category, i.e. 
consisting of business management, including planning and targets determination at the 
macro-level should be classed as inherently economic activities. Their economic nature is by 
no means erased with the transfer from the micro to the macro-scale.  
There is mor to Parsons’ view of the interchanges between the economy and the polity. 
Namely, the said theory makes it possible for the American sociologist to consider 
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conditioning of the political system on part of the economic structure. He notes that each 
political system must have at its disposal physical facilities of power. In other words, for the 
political subsystem to function, it must possess tanks, batons, prisons, court and police 
premises, offices etc. In view of this dependence, the political system is, as Parsons points 
out, vitally interested in the size and productive potential of the industrial apparatus. 
 
 
4.  THE ECONOMY AND SCIENCE  
 
The authors of the book being discussed deal with the relationship of the economic 
structure to other non-economic substructures of society at large. 
Writing about land as one of the factors of production, they distinguish within it another 
factor of science. Now the combination of these two factors should be considered singularly 
sound given the nature of the land which in terms of socio-economic theory of property as 
providing its owner with gratuitous benefits. The same applies to science.  
Penetration of science into the sphere of the economy concerns by no means merely 
material components of production. Parsons mentions in this context such phenomena like an 
implementation of various technologies, purchases of know-how, but also points to an 
embodiment of science in the form of skills of the labour power. It should be added that this 
kind of science’s economic relevance refers exclusively to those elements of physics, 
geometry, chemistry and so on, which are actually applied by a given worker in his 
operations, and not to his or her scientific knowledge in general. To put it another way, it is 
only that scientific knowledge that is a necessary condition of execution of this or that work 
task, which is at stake here. The above supplement is in order because of certain 
interpretations of the role of science with reference to the economic structure present, among 
others, in theories of ‘scientific-technological revolution’, ’knowledge-based society’, 
‘information society’ etc. What is meant at this moment are such views, which from the 
evidence on heightened economic power of the natural sciences draw the conclusion that the 
science, as supposedly occupying ever larger space of the economy, broadens its scope as a 
substructure of society, at the expense of the economic substructure, whose size is, therefore, 
shrinking.  
This misinterpretation is based on the following misunderstanding. While science is in 
fact present in various forms within the economy, it does not follow, of course, that the types 
of activity in which definite elements of science are used are transformed into scientific 
activities. Thus, any talk about appropriation by science of even small part of the economy 
relies on a complete misunderstanding. The situation here is analogous in certain respect to 
one considered above in relation to state activities, which in some instances are of economic 
nature. For example, if a given management activity is performed not by an chief executive 
officer, but by someone who bears the title of Trade Secretary or Energy Minister, it does not 
lose thereby its economic characteristics.  
Parsons, however, does not commit the above error. He avoids this mistaken view by 
simply outlining a scheme showing the social journey of science all the way from its creation 
till entering the economy. Especially relevant in the present context is a divide between those 
elements of science that are potentially accessible to the purposes of economic use and those 
which are in fact used in productive consumption. 
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5.  THE ECONOMIC MICROSTRUCTURE  
The economic microstructure  
What is by the author of the paper termed pre-material or conceptual labour consisting 
in production of so-called ideal means and objects of work, which activity is typically in 
modern conditions based on science application belongs to the economic structure, or, to use 
Marx’s term, productive forces of society. This problematics is considered at length in 
‘Economy and Society’. For what the authors do is an application of their functional scheme 
not only at the macro, but also micro level. The economy, therefore, is divided into four 
familiar systems, which are further subdivided. In other words, within each subsystem itself 
there is another AGIL system – corporations (of the adaptive subsystem) contain within them 
positions specifically involved with internally regulating values (for example human 
resources departments) promulgating norms (the legal department), political organisation 
(board of directors) and adaptation to the environment. Oftentimes not entirely clear and 
convincing terminology hides rather precise and detailed analysis of the inner structure of the 
economic system. It is conducted, to be sure, with reference to the unit division of labour, and 
it covers relationships writhing the all-societal division of labour to much smaller degree, 
which, however, does not detract from the cognitive worth of the particular observations, 
which are to be found in this section of the book.  
Thus, a hidden premise of placing within the ‘production subsystem’ of the substructure 
called ‘co-ordination of production’ appears recognition of types of work performed within it, 
i.e. organisation of collective material work, assignment of particular workers to specific 
means of production as an economic (in our terminology: indirectly material) labour.  
Similarly, inclusion within the production system of the sector termed ‘provision with 
utilities’ signifies that all the problems with qualifying such activities at the macro-level 
notwithstanding, at the micro-level it is much mor difficult to deny evident factts. Despite 
previously analysed reservations, therefore, Parsons finally includes exchange, purchase of 
instruments and materials of work into the economy and admits that their continuous inflow is 
a necessary condition of the latter’s functioning.  
We have considered so far Parsons’ views on the economic structure, including its 
microstructure. What this analysis has shown, is the circumstance that the economy is a 
complex network of interrelated social relations. This complexity as well as its social 
dimension exclude its reduction to a primitive labour process, and, equally, its 
conceptualisation in terms of the means of work plus their operator.  
Turning to the issue of mutual relations of particular societal structures, let us remind 
that in particular an analysis of how Parsons views the ties of science and the economy has 
allowed us to correct some , to our mind, misinterpretations of the issue in question. Parsons, 
however, does not restrict himself to the above-mentioned substructure of society. Equally 
instructive, as will be seen, is his treatment of so-called basic cell of society. 
 
 
6.  THE ECONOMY AND THE FAMILY  
 
In the case of the family, one can observe similar in a sense problems as regards its 
relation to the economy as those considered above with reference to science, the difference 
being that in the present case the problems are in reverse, as it were. In the former instance 
from the presence of numerous elements of science in the economy the conclusion has been 
derived that those parts of the economic structure in which science has been applied are no 
longer economic but scientific in nature. In the present case, on the other hand, the reasoning, 
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resting on a similar basis, goes in an opposite direction; just it is argued that at certain stage of 
its development the economy cannot exist without science, it is also pointed to an evident fact 
that it cannot also function without the family as a source of labour power which is, of course, 
an indispensable factor of production or, more generally, any economic action. From this 
undisputable circumstance it is concluded that this time it is acts of reproduction and 
socialisation that have economic character. And again, Parsons’ position relative to the 
aforementioned issue is, in contradistinction to the supporters of the view mentioned above 
right. He even labels the view according to which ‘socialisation is a form of economic 
production’ ‘naive’. To substantiate his criticism, he builds, as in the above discussed case of 
science, a scheme showing an entire life career of an hypothetical individual and he argues 
that the individual enters at certain moment the labour force does not turn all his or her 
previous life stages, including birth and socialisation into an component of the economy.  
 
 
7.  SUMMARY AND THEORETICAL - METHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
Summing up our discussion of ‘Economy and Society’ so far, it can be pointed out that 
it clearly albeit indirectly suggests that, firstly, the interrelations between the economic 
structure and non-economic structures are so complex and multifaceted that they cannot be 
reduced to any simple formulae, all the more that, secondly, they are variable in time, and, 
thirdly, that their scientific analysis requires, as its point of departure, working out of precise 
concepts of both the economic and non-economic structures. 
Thus, from an analysis of Parsonian views one can draw not only negative but also 
positive lessons. Amongst the former ones an outstanding role is played by Parsons’ 
methodological approach, or, rather, ‘anti-approach’, in that one should be warned against its 
use. One of its traits is speculative approach to the issues considered, squeezing their real or 
imaginary solution into the straitjacket of an deductive model adopted a priori. 
Such an approach is also evident in the aforementioned theory of productive factors, as 
interpreted through the prism of the notion of subsystem interchanges. Take, for example, the 
‘organization’ factor treated as a contribution of the entrepreneur. First an formost, ‘Economy 
and Society’ leaves us essentially ignorant as regards the real content of that factor. One does 
not know whether, following in the footsteps of Schumpeter, one should understand that a 
given agent withdraws some of the resources existing in the static economy, and then 
proceeds to use them in a different manner, i.e. carrying out of new combinations.  
On the other hand, Parsons by no means rules out an interpretation according to which 
the concept under discussion would refer to day- by-day management, which does not 
necessarily imply any innovative activity in the above-mentioned sense.  
On the one hand, Parsons associates an entepreneurial function with ‘co-ordination and 
planning of economic actions’, but on the other, another page of the book shows ‘necessary 
co-ordination’ as a distinct concept.  
Thus, one is not able to determine whether one has to do with an agent of creative 
construction, as the moving force that carries out new combinations in the economy, or an 
ordinary manager, the motive power of the economic development or a common economic 
functionary. One consequence to this lack of clarity is obscuring what is from our point of 
view an important distinction between co-ordination and supervision of work,
1
 which, albeit 
they may be carried out by the same person, they remain analytically distinct.  
                                                          
1
 FOOTNOTES: 
1
 which, in our view, is distinguished by the use of sanctions, whilst from the viewpoint of 
Parsons’ general theory is characteristic of each and every action 
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By the way, in another context Parsons himself points out that organizational activities 
can be performed by employees occupying various positions, e.g. members of managerial or 
administration staff, but also those employed in the technological division. This is a genuilely 
sociological view, and as such deserving praise. Parsons implies here that for purposes of 
socio-economic research, knowledge of formal occupational titles is not enough, one should 
look at the empirical content of given types of work. 
There is more to that, however. Parsons, namely, construes the concept of organization 
as a function of his subsystem whose aim is societal integration. There is no independent 
substantiation of this decision apart from citation of the definition of the function in question 
alone.  
 
 
8.  ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY  
 
The above-mentione theory of production factors can serve as an example of how 
Parsons approaches the issue of mutual relations between the two disciplines concerned. On 
the grounds of the theory just mentioned particular factors of production represent more 
general categories of inputs and outputs. And indeed, more generally speaking, Parsons treats 
economics as a special case of his theory of social systems, which, in turn, remains in the 
same position relative to eeven more universal theory of general system of action.  
‘The specifically economic aspect of the theory of social systems[…] is a special case of 
the general theory of the social system. […] the basic variables operative in all the special 
cases are the variables of a more general theory’ (1956: 6). 
At the beginning of his book Parsons lists a number of examples, which are to 
corroborate the above view. Even giving the author the maximum benefit of the doubt is not 
in a position to convince one that it is really the case. 
Thus, in Parsons’ view such economic categories as ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ represent 
special cases of mor general concepts of ‘achievement’ and ‘sanction’, which, under his 
general theory pertain to each action. This is hardly convincing, however. Note that by the 
same token one could lay out an indefinite number of analogies between similar or 
complementary phenomena. Why not, for instance, juxtapose the above pair of economic 
concepts with ‘sea inflow’ and ‘out low’. But does it follow from the above comparison that 
economics is a special case of hydrology? Or, possibly the reverse is the case. 
Further, Parsons argues that what in economics is known as ‘goods’ and ‘services’ 
refers in fact to a sociological dichotomy of ‘physical objects’ and ‘social objects’. This view, 
again, is entirely useless in terms of both economics and sociology; one is not able to indicate 
any advantage that would stem from the substitution of the concepts in question. 
On these grounds it could be claimed that Parsonian methodology is based on an 
underlying principle of ‘application’ or ‘sumsumption’, which is also apparent in his theory of 
the general system of action characterised by indeed sweeping generalisation or universalism, 
as its categories, according to its creator, are to refer to the entire biopsychosociocultural 
world.  
The term ‘subsumption’ indicates the above-considered feature of Parsons’ thought that 
consists in conceiving phenomena of a given realm as special cases of some more general 
one, thus establishing particular spheres of reality in a hierarchical order. In the case of 
economics, just as in other instances, for that matter the logic of reasoning should, though, 
lead the author in an opposite direction – after establishing that the economy constitutes a 
distinct subsystem of broader societal system, the next logical step ought to consist of 
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working out a set of categories and propositions that would highlight that specificity. 
Unfortunately, in ‘Economy and Society’ Parsons has gone in quite another direction, which 
is symbolised by his words: ‘At the most general, constitutive of the economic theory level, 
no specifically economic variables exist, they are categories of the general theory of action, as 
the economic categories can be derived from the general theory’. 
Such a reductionist view cannot but affect proportions of pages of ‘Economy and 
Society’ occupied by numerous attempts to place this or that category in a definite square 
within a certain scheme or diagram, and those devoted to rather neglected in comparison with 
the former preoccupation as, it appears, deemed less interesting a down-to-earth analysis of 
economic phenomena and processes. Such a hierarchy of priorities also leaves much less 
room for what, as suggests Parsonian theory of interchanges, should constitute the key focus 
of his interest: i.e. an investigation of interrelations between the economic structure and other 
societal structures, which interrelations are so complex and multisided that any attempt to 
reduce them to a pair of factors exchanged between every two structures must turn out to be a 
failure. 
It has to be pointed out that the period of using by Parsons of what has been termed here 
a methodological approach premised on sumpsumption has lasted long after publication of 
‘Economy and Society’. It would be no exaggeration to say that it dominated his work; 
Parsons, retaining the basic functional scheme, has focused in later years on its reformulation, 
adding new details and extension into previously neglected societal fields  
Looking at this development, one can observe an increasing tendency towards 
formalism. The strengthening of formalism manifests itself in pushing the boundaries of 
concepts used, so that they become devoid of any identifiable empirical reference, and 
eliminating categories possessing such a referent. Thus, as far as the relations between the 
economy and the polity go, Parsons ceases to talk about per cent drawn from loans and the 
factor of supporting industrial enterprises’ vanishes as well. The concept of organisation, 
which, despite it ill definition, has allowed one to grasp some real economic processes gets 
substituted by even more vague notion of ‘patterns of allocation of resources’, which 
allocation is to be carried out by means of influence. The connection of the two appears rather 
enigmatic, and in all probability is accounted for, in keeping with our earlier observations, by 
the circumstance that the medium termed influence has found itself at the intersection of 
certain subsystems, and not the others. 
To do justice to Parsonian treatment of economic phenomena, one should draw attention 
to the fact that it can be interpreted in another angle, namely, as a mor or less succesful 
attempt to introduce an sociological perspective to an analysis of the economic structure. 
‘empirically most so-called ‘economic’ processes must be regarded as resultants of economic 
and non-economic factors’ (1956: 6). It is the very argument that the ‘concrete’ is made up of 
‘systems,’ rather than ‘individual acts,’ that underlies the following claim of Parsons and 
Smelser that ‘if we view the goal of the economy as defined strictly by socially structured 
goals, it becomes inappropriate even to refer to utility at this level in terms of individual 
preference lists or indifference curves. . . . 
Therefore, it is correct to speak, with only apparent paradox, of the ‘maximization of 
utility’ in a social context without at the same time making any statements about the 
interpersonal measurability of utility’ (1956: 22).  
We cannot agree mor with Parsons, therefore, when he critisises modern economists, 
not excluding Keynes for explaining economic processes by individuals’ psychological 
leanings or tendencies, and motivations, as well by specific traits of human nature. However, 
fully sharing Parsons’ rejection of psychologism and antropologism in economics, we should 
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not confine ourselves to expressing this solidarity. It must be checked, however, what the real 
effects of this convincing rhetoric are, or, to put it differently, to establish if his research 
practice is where his mouth is, so to speak.  
We are sorry to say that the results of this practical test do not match Parsons’ 
declarations. It is true, then, that makes some steps toward the sociological treatment of 
motives of economic action. He writes, for instance, that different stimuli of bankers on the 
one hand, and workers on the other are to be explained by their involvement in distinct 
situational contexts. The reader, however, does not receive any analysis of these respective 
objective conditions, but merely the statement , being another example of ‘application’ 
procedure identified above according to which an analysis of motivations in occupational 
roles is a special case of an general theory of motivation in institutionalised roles, and, with 
proper modifications, these broadest – not cited categories will satisfactorily account for the 
behavior of any economic agent.  
We are afraid that the remaining illustrations of Parsons’ sociological approach to 
economics are not consistent with his intentions either. Could one, for instance, agree without 
any reservations with the view that the main problem concerning the labour force in a 
capitalistic economy is their socialisation, such shaping of workers’ motivation that they 
would be willing to adopt as theirs own the goals of productivity. 
One cannot leave this statement without criticism given granted that Parsonian account 
of workers’ motivation and mechanisms of the labour market omits workers’, as owners of 
sole labour power, being therefore subject to  economic pressure to work, it being for them 
one and only possibility of acquiring the means of subsistence. 
In return, Parsons indulges in rather dubious formulations about ‘common value 
patterns’ shared by the free partners of an contract, which, after all, are the employee and the 
employer, on ‘comprehensive loyalty’ and ‘trust’ constituting, according to Parsonian theory, 
inputs of the worker for the benefit of the firm, which reciprocates in the form of ‘support’ 
and ‘moral approbation’. 
Leaving aside an ideological bias of the above statement, one should, once again, raise a 
question of its applicability to Parsons’ fatherland rather than the European or Asiatic variants 
of capitalism, where indeed workers’ rights are respected to much grater extent than in his 
native type of capitalism. Other exemplifications of Parsonian approach are not able to 
invalidate our doubts as to its inability to overcome on a practical basis psychologism. For 
instance, a decrease of labour force on the labour market the American sociologist proposes to 
explain by, for one thing, their deficit of ‘comprehensive loyalty’, and, for another, by the fact 
that they ceased to value production.  
Not only the above contention , contrary to anti-nominalistic and holistic, as he himself 
refers to them, methodological assumptions does not transcend a vicious circle of 
individualistic subjectivism, but it is subject, as can be easily seen, to the criticism of 
tautology. It is of little, if anything, use to criticise Keynesian notion of ‘general propensities’, 
if all what is meant to substitute it are such quasi-explanatory factors, similar to Moliere’s 
famous example of explaining why one falls asleep after opium by pointing to the latter’s 
hypnotic powers. 
Employing categories such as these there can essentially be no phenomenon that cannot 
be explained. ‘Why Americans are fond of highly developed high-technology sector?’ 
‘Because they value science and technology’. ‘Why does Mr Smith not love Ms Smith?’ 
‘Because love is no longer any value to him’. And so on, and so forth, the list can be 
practically endless. Thus, does not, as it happens, Keynes’ low-grade psychology has been 
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substituted with an equally ill-conceived sociology? Values, their patterns and systems are, 
incidentally, Parsons’ favourite explanatory factor.  
What remains as ‘ specifically sociologica’ categories meant to fight psychologism is 
extremely limited. Is there, for example, any material difference, as to their scientific worth, 
the concept of ‘propensities’, which appears in Keynes, and its substitute from ‘Economy and 
Society’, i.e. ‘expectations’?  
From the economist’s standpoint, it turns out, the well-known set of functional 
imperatives is worthless. Ch. Morsey notes in this context that Parsons’ assertion according to 
which differents patterns of family expenditures reflect distinct solutions of those four 
functional problems does not contribute anything of value to economics. 
The inability to succesfully purge psychologism from economic sociology is also 
evident in Parsonian theory of change. What is relevant here is especially his claim 
accounting for the much discussed phenomenon of separation of ownership and control. 
Parsons's (1975) exchange with Gintis (1975) around the issue of ownership and control 
within the capitalist enterprise speaks volumes about his approach, as Parsons conducts it 
entirely as a matter of ‘correct specification in terms of the theory of the social system, with 
no consideration that there may also be issues of empirical adequacy in their competing 
accounts’ (Holmwood 2006). Such an approach allows the American sociologist to explain 
the said phenomenon in rather idiosyncratic way, pointing to the dissatisfaction of prospective 
managers and other, as he calls them, dissident elements with the way in which corporations 
are run. In this odd account the whole sphere of objective conditions is left out of the picture. 
Amongst these objective conditions were: an increase in size of enterprises making it difficult, 
if not impossible, for an individual owner to single-handedly manage the firm, an increasing 
extension and conplication of production and sales, necessisating hiring of industrial 
engineers, marketing specialists, finance directors etc. 
This lack of taking consideration of the aforementioned objective circumstances is not 
the sole drawback of Parsonian comments in the said context. One such doubtful claim 
maintains that the personal ownership of securities on part of professional executives has only 
nominal significance. Parsons’ account not only does not takes consideration of objective 
data; to the contrary but, taking as his frame of reference jurisprudential rather than socio-
economic property theory, fails to consider in that context not only various equity-based 
forms of managerial compensation, but even salaries and bonuses, which are in many cases so 
astronomically high that they cannot be regarded as simply pay for their work since any factor 
of ‘heavy responsibili’y', ‘length of the working day’ or whatever are not in position to justify 
those skyrocketing earnings indeed, at least in part, and in most cases it is not a tiny 
proportion, they should be viewed as financial benefits derived from corporate capital . This is 
also shown by their further destination: because of their size, they cannot be consumed, but 
are converted into some form of capital.  
It is not only on the grounds of the above considerations that one must reject related 
Parsonian assertion pointing out the demise of property in modern capitalism, which implies a 
shift of the focus of power into the hands of professional managers. A lack of disposal of truly 
socio-economic theory of property makes it impossible for the author of ‘Economy and 
Society’ to notice that the modern capitalist society is characterised, if anything, by an 
increase of the role of ownership. This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that ownership 
of capital allows its holder to live without a necessity of any work (taken over by the hired 
managers). By way of summary, it should be noted that ‘Economy and Society’ contains 
within itself two relatively independent layers, as it were. The first one consists of the 
application of the ‘subsumption’ model to an analysis of interrelations of economics and 
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Parsonian general theory of action. In lots of cases, as the alleged analogies between pairs of 
concepts pertaining to the two disciplines most clearly show, the said procedure produces 
manifestly figurative results. In the same field one should include all instances in which the 
functional paradigm reveals its arbitrary nature, manifested most blatantly in unsubstantiated 
associations of given empirical phenomena and processes with specific functions. 
If, however, we describe the above discussed layer as epiphenomenal, it follows that it 
can be without any harm substracted from the second layer, whose value is incomparably 
higher. 
 
  
9.  MODERN CAPITALISM  
 
Parsonian paradigm of inputs and outputs has led him to succesfully investigate the 
interrelationships between the economic structure and other societal structures. On the other 
hand, his approach to systems as consisting of a set of subsystems, strongly rminding A 
matryoshka doll, or babushka doll, i.e. a Russian nesting doll which is a set of dolls of 
decreasing sizes placed one inside the other has made it possible to dwell into the inner 
structure of the economy, with equally valuable results. As a consequence, ‘Economy and 
Society’ contains fairly adequate picture of contemporary capitalism.  
It depicts its big corporations, underlines the role of science in the economy, 
highlighting , among others, the significance of scientifically trained labour force, takes 
account of the economic functions of the state. To be sure, not always facts cited by Parsons 
matched their theoretical interpretations, in many cases one has also to do with over-
generalisations, treating as universal the phenomena specific to concrete nations. For 
example, the claim reducing trade unions’ functions to their purely semi-ritual role as opposed 
to collective bargaining cannot be said to be generally true. Not all unions, as Parsons would 
have it, have transformed themselves from an institution protecting employees as against 
employers into an organisation protecting employees in relation to the remaining citizens of 
society. Luckily, in ‘Economy and Society’ one can find other, much more pertinent and 
convincing cotentions. In one of the above paragraphs Parsonian questionable account of 
relations between workers and capitalistss has been discussed.  
There is, however, another, more felicitous side to it where Parsons talks more realistic 
language. He writes, for example, that a worker taking a job in a firm, entrusts the latter with 
his own and his family’s security, points out that the firm, that representative of the collective 
capitalist acquires thereby rights of intervention into the life of the household whose head is 
its employee(its extreme form being his or her layoff or dismissal), which implies a capability 
to control the long-term fortumes of the household.  
Acknowlegement of long-term dependence of a capitalistic employee and her/his family 
upon the laws governing the capitalist economy is , in Parsons’ case, connected with 
recognition of essentially antagonistic character of relations in bourgeois society. Parsons 
does not hesitate to speak of what he reckons hidden conflict of interests of employees and 
employes, not excluding its outbreak. He also points to the contradiction of value systems, 
attitudes and ideologies of the world of work and the world of business. 
These statements have been cited to show frequent misjudgments of Parsons’ 
ideological position, who is often charged with consevatism, right wing bias, or even 
reactionarism. Meanwhile, Parsons in ‘Economy and Society’ seeks to avoid ideological 
commitments, strives to study the phenomena under discussion sine ira et studio. 
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10.  THE SOCIOLOGY OF MONEY 
 
Parsons presents an interesting and valuable theory of money, which apparently draws 
on Weber, Simmel and Marx. Along with familiar economic functions of money, his 
deliberations contain fairly original notion of degrees of freedom made possible thanks to this 
medium.  
Parsons described money as a medium of exchange whose function consists in 
measuring value (Parsons 1963: 236). Money is thereby symbolic, ‘in that though measuring 
and thus ‘standing for’ economic value or utility, it does not itself possess utility in the 
primary consumption sense-it has no ‘value in use’ but only ‘in exchange’, i.e. for possession 
of things having utility’ (Parsons 1963: 236). The offers to buy or sell goods or services are 
communicated through the medium of money. Parsons traced the development of money to its 
roots in precious metals, which have intrinsic value. This connection is fully lost in 
differentiated money economies, to the extent that money becomes worthless in regard to its 
use value. The theoretical problem arising from the worthlessness of money (why should ego 
be willing to exchange a good for worthless money in the exchange process?) is deciphered 
by Parsons pointing to the four degrees of freedom that actors achieve through the medium of 
money: the buyer can spend money on any goods; he or she can buy from any producer; the 
buyer can freely decide on the time of purchase; and he or she is free to accept or reject the 
terms of purchase. The disadvantage of the worthlessness of money is compensated by the 
gain in options and motivates acceptance of the medium in exchange. 
However, the risk remains that money will not be accepted by third parties or that it will 
become worthless due to inflation. This risk remains because money is not tied to a product 
that has a use value. However, the disconnection of money from its historical origins in 
precious metals is, according to Parsons, a precondition for its functional efficiency as a 
medium of exchange, which is why this risk is part of the structure of differentiated 
economies. 
Only the actors’ trust in the stability and acceptance of the symbolic medium can be 
supported through its institutionalization. ‘There must be an element of bindingness in the 
institutionalization of the medium itself-e.g. the fact that the money of a society is a ‘legal 
tender’ which must be accepted in the settlement of debts which have the status of contractual 
obligations under the law’ (1963: 240). At the same time, the institutionalization of money 
allows a separation of economic exchange processes from their anchoring in culturally 
sanctioned expectations of reciprocity. Only under these conditions do the degrees of 
freedom, which have been attained through acquisition of money, become relevant, which 
could otherwise not be exercised due to institutionalized obligations. What, from whom, 
when, and for what price something is purchased is no longer culturally decided. The 
resulting uncertainty of economic decisions can no longer be normatively reduced. (Beckert 
2006) To put it from slightly different angle, money, as a generalised medium of exchange 
can stand for a wide range of goods, allowing a sophisticated division of labour not available 
in barter economies. Furthermore it allows large amounts of capital to be built up, and hence 
large scale production to be engaged in. This example highlights the importance of input from 
the other subsystems. As money is symbolic it has no real use-value in itself - a £5 note is 
nothing more than a flimsy piece of paper after all. Input from the value commitment and 
normative subsystems generates trust allowing us to accept that we can exchange the note for 
its promissory value on demand.   
< http://www.spc.uchicago.edu/ssr1/PRELIMS/Theory/parsons.html>. 
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Parsons sees the precondition for the functional differentiation of the economy in the 
development of a money economy. In an economy that is characterized by highly specialized 
production processes, the direct exchange between labor and consumer goods would not be 
practicable and, besides, would not take the diverging interests of families and companies into 
account. While a company's production decisions are oriented toward expected profits […]. 
Through the medium of money, consumers can attain independence from the products they 
produce, which makes it possible to adequately speak of the development of lifestyles on the 
basis of consumer choices. The different needs of the economy and the family can be 
reconciled as consumer demand and labor demand become separated by the exchange 
medium of money from concrete producers and at the same time remain connected to each 
other on a generalized level (Beckert 2006). 
This presentation of Parsons’ treatment of money allows one to refer to certain 
counterarguments that have been raised by its critics. Ganssmann (1989: 293) argues that 
Parsons's theory of money has always assumed that an institutional trust in money exists, 
without, however, explaining where this trust comes from. According to Ganssmann, the 
theory therefore describes a functioning economy but cannot explain its origins. The first 
point is simply untrue. It is one thing to accept Parsons’ explanation, but the denial that he has 
put forward such an explanation based on his conception of subsystem interchanges is quite 
another. The second point, however, refers to some genuine weakness in Parsons’ approach, 
but only indirectly. For what should be expressly pointed to here is not any lack of purely 
theoretical argument, but, rather, it’s in fact important gap that lies in its lack of historical 
dimension. Only in such terms, as shown by marx and many economic historians studying the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism, or, more generally, the emergence of the commodity-
money economy, can the problem indicated be solved. Even less justice to Parsons’ approach 
does the second main criticism made by his opponents who attribute to it an ‘obvious 
underestimation of money's societal relevance. By considering money merely as a symbol-
which was already problematic (1963: 290ff.) Marx's and Weber's insight that the monetary 
economy enables an orientation toward profits as its own end was ignored. Money is the 
central instrument for the orientation toward the profit motive and makes possible the 
principally unlimited dynamics of capitalist economies, detached from concrete needs (1963: 
292). Parsons's theory of money, however, completely in the tradition of the neoclassical 
theory of money, plays down the possible social implications of money by understanding it 
only as a neutral means to simplify exchange’ (Beckert 2006). Christoph Deutschmann's 
(1999: 44) criticism follows these same lines. He accuses Parsons's theory of money of not 
recognizing ‘wealth characteristics of money’ and with this its potential to reach beyond the 
economic system and to attain social power. 
This suggests that money is not only a neutral means of exchange; it contains the 
‘additional usefulness’ of freedom of choice. Compared to the owner of a good, the owner of 
money can transfer his or her wealth easily from one use to the next and achieve social power 
by strategically exploiting this possibility. 
On the other hand, according to Deutschmann, Parsons ignores the imaginary dimension 
of action, which is embodied in money and consists of the possibility to attain not only 
existing wealth but even imaginable future wealth. Only monetary wealth initiates ‘the 
production of today unknown products by not yet known producers’ (1963: 54). 
All in all, this criticism of Parsons's theory of money from economic sociology 
practically amounts to the point that ‘he underestimates the social-structural importance of 
money (cf. Zelizer 1994). 
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The reason for this is suspected to lie in Parsons's premise to acknowledge the 
neoclassical theory of money’ (Beckert 2006). This criticism is obviously one-sided in that it 
fails to recognize Parsons’ discussion of precisely social functions of money, his notion of the 
degrees of freedom attainable thanks to money included. Second, while Parsons, to be sure, 
was not Marx, his sociology does not hesitate to disclose some genuine contradictions and 
conflicts peculiar to the capitalist economy, and the association of money with an orientation 
on profit of capitalist firms is, contrary to Parsons’ critics, one of the cardinal arguments of 
the theory. The critics’ blunder is  made even more glaring by their  failure to take account of 
Parsonian criticism of conventional economics. In point of fact, Parsons’ main source of 
inspiration was Keynesian economic theory in which money clearly matters. More 
specifically, According to Keynes, a stable underemployment equilibrium can arise precisely 
because economic actors can reserve parts of their investment funds in liquidity. 
This hoarding of money for speculative reasons can lead to depriving the economy of 
sufficient investment funds. Keynes thus establishes a connection between money and the real 
economy, a connection that is largely refuted in neoclassical theory. The actual amount of 
money that is kept in liquid form decisively depends on a noneconomic entity according to 
Keynes, namely, the expectations of the investors concerning the further development of the 
interest rate and the long-term revenues from capital investments. Here, Keynes refers to the 
‘state of confidence,’ in other words, the trust in market development, as relevant for the rate 
of investment (Keynes 1949: 149). The actual expectations actors hold with regard to future 
states of the economy do not, however, reflect a rational estimate. This is impossible due to 
uncertainty. Instead, the expectations and the level of confidence are an expression of ‘mass 
psychology’ and ‘animal spirits,’ making ‘economic prosperity. . . excessively dependent on a 
political and social atmosphere’ (1949: 162). 
This implies that the integration of economic processes depends to a high degree on the 
creation of confidence (or trust) in processes of social interaction. Parsons's media theory 
follows this central characteristic of modern money economies by no longer primarily 
referring to mechanisms of normative integration for explaining the interpersonal 
generalization of meaning, but instead turning to the expressive-symbolic communication of 
affect. What matters is convincing alter in situations that are principally characterized by 
uncertainty, that is, to produce a ‘state of confidence.’ The result of Parsons and Smelser's 
analysis of financial markets was specifically that no general value orientations guide action, 
but rather that the contingent achievement to convince actors of the positive prospects of their 
investments is what really counts. The state of confidence can be created only through 
communication-the possibility of which is established by the very same differentiation 
processes, induced through the medium of money, that represent the expansion of the freedom 
of choice for the actor. With that, economic sociology is guided toward an interactionist 
theory of the communication of affect. None of the critiques from economic sociology on 
Parsons recognized this theoretical aspect that paves a way to a pragmatist understanding of 
action in economic contexts (Beckert 2003). 
An important theoretical basis for the sociological understanding of the integration of 
market processes could lie in this because it offers an alternative to the less plausible 
assumption of primarily normative integration of modern economies’ (Beckert 2006). 
This in our opinion necessary doing justice to Parsonian sociology of money does not 
mean, however, that it is flawless.  
As has been already noted above, Talcott Parsons introduced the idea of money as a 
‘symbolically generalized medium of communication’ (Parsons 1967). This idea was taken up 
and modified in different respects by Habermas (1981) and Luhmann (1994). These 
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differences nothwistanding, the three theorists’ shared starting point was an analogy between 
language and money. A second analogy was used to introduce other “symbolically 
generalized media of communication’, first among them power. These media, one for each 
subsystem of society, were constructed in analogy to money.  
Let us consider the basic premise of the theory in somewhat more detail. 
It is tru that language may be construed as a medium of comminication of aims of its 
given user. These functions of money(medium of exchange, store of value etc.) can be 
ascertained from the context of the act in question. In this respect money is indeed similar to 
language, which also can be deployed as a means of various ends. Thus, language may serve 
to describe the external world, or own feelings and evaluations; it can be also used as a tol of 
singing, persuasion or command. Two last examples show the fallacy inherent in 
juxtaposition of language and other media. To utter a command is in no way power itself, 
which can be conceived of as a capability of forcing other people’s action, its modification or 
stopping, but merely an instrument of its implementation. Meanwhile, with reference to the 
view attributing power to the political system, it should be noted that it represents only one 
form of power, i.e. the monopoly of legimitate use of the means of coercion, thus not taking 
account of what is termed economic power. 
Similarly, persuasion is not the same as influence, which can be understood as causing 
other people to take action, modify or stop it within the voluntary social relation, but can be 
considered merely as a means of such influence. 
Thus, in both these cases there occurs confusion of levels of analysis; language cannot 
be treated as analogous to social relations mediated by it. However, the central analogy of 
language and money also suffers from inherent limitations. Despite much trumpeted term: 
‘generalised symbolic medium’, it is certainly language as indefinitely elastic medium, by 
means of which one can both swear and express with Proustian sophistication most subtle 
psychological tones that deserves the label ‘universal’ or ‘general’ than money, which reduces 
all qualities to quantities. 
 In addition, language contains within itself metalanguage; by means of language one 
can refer to or clarify particular utterances or pronouncements, which cannot be done in case 
of money. On the contrary, it is the use of money that is usually accompanied by language 
utterances as explaining the objective of action taken with its participation, or kind of function 
realised by it. 
It happens sometimes, to be sure, as Ganszmann (1999) notes, that , albeit in a limited 
context, that money performs the role of language, requiring, however, an additional use of 
the body language. Such cases can be observed with reference to tourists in an exotic country 
when purchasing a good from local inhabitants. 
Thus, both Habermas and Luhmann are right in defining money in terms of a special 
language. Indeed, language can exist without money, whilst money cannot function without 
language. 
Exchange means transfer of property. Money as an object of ownership is exchanged in 
return of, say, some consumer good. Even more clearly this ownership linkage is brought out 
in case of money as a component of money capital.  
Meanwhile, language constitutes public good; particular symbols are not subject to 
appropriation.  
The aforementioned reductionism of money implies that on its basis one can generate 
out communications of considerably poorer content than in the case of language. On the other 
hand, however, recognition of money as a means of influence implies that it significantly 
more often than language can serve as a cause of events it is oriented on, be it selling a dress 
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by a shop assistant, or booking a hotel room by the Internet, thus comprising both direct 
interaction and indirect socio-economic relation. This provides yet another argument 
undermining ‘communication’ metaphor. The use of money cannot be reduced to 
communication, because it is concerned with non-communication objects: material goods and 
services or the labour power. 
As regards transferring the characteristics of money as a model medium onto remaining 
media, one can note that power is not characterised by any symbolic system that could be 
conceived of as direct and undisputable equivalent of money. As distinct from money, any 
quantification of power units is not feasible. Power is, to be sure, alienable, but it cannot 
circulate so freely as money. It cannot also be put into any bank account, and owing to the 
fact that in modern democracies it is election processes that determine the distribution of 
power, any talk of inflation or deflation of power, as analogous to respective monetary 
processes, is groundless. In addition, whilst an exttension of credit or investment in the 
economy increases the inner complexity of the system (Plucinski 2006), the intensification of 
power is a double-edged sword, as it leads, earlier or later, to more or less strong 
countermeasures, which boomerang reaction precludes production of any greater complexity. 
Even more questionable is the analogy between money and two remaining media. 
Influence and value-commitments are extremely difficult, if not impossible to alienate, 
measure and accumulate.  
In the above criticism we are not alone. Other scholars also point out that parsonian  
analogies are somewhat misleading. Money has properties reaching beyond language. And 
other media, like power, do not share crucial properties of money (Ganßmann 1988, 1996).  
In abstracting from the differences between objects, institutions, social relations and 
concepts by lumping together money, power, influence, love, truth and more, in Luhmann´s 
case, or money and power in Habermas’ emphasis on the system/life-world distinction, the 
idea of symbolically generalized media of communication became too fuzzy to be useful.  
[…]the analogy of language and money, the idea that money is a ‘special language’ is 
misleading in picturing money merely as a harmless, beneficial social device (Ganszmann). 
“Parsons himself says that the theory was developed as a generalization from the 
properties of money (Parsons 1977a: 198-201; 1977b: 205-8), the very name of the theory 
indicates a fundamental tension running through it. The idea of media, firstly, refers to the 
necessity of building links between social relations already differentiated. The idea of 
interchange, secondly, refers to money being paradigmatic for conceptualizing the 'give-and-
take' relationships between subsystems, and for measuring the equivalence of those relations 
as well. In the case of the concepts of symbolization and generalization, thirdly, the former 
refers to the exchange-value of money as well as the symbolic utility of language (Parsons 
1977b: 206); whereas the latter means that every medium can represent several objects in 
different contexts of interaction. The references to generalization and symbolization are also 
related to the anthropological and sociological capacities of human beings to operate 
symbolically and to use these skills in a socially effective way. In that sense, language, as a 
set of generalized symbols, is the secondary source for the understanding of media’. 
The ultimate aim of the theory is the theorization of social co-ordination in differential 
societies. 
Parsons, as has been noted, proposed that money is not the only medium in the social 
system and defined three more, each one especially related to one subsystem: power (political 
system), influence
5
 (societal community) and value commitments (fiduciary system). 
It cannot be clear, at first sight, what money has in common with the other media. 
Hence the thesis that Parsons develops a real theory should be supported by showing some 
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properties which, as a generalization of the characteristics of money, are adequate to the 
remaining media. In the Parsonian version of the theory of interchange media, these 
properties can be summarized as follows.
7 
 
1.  Norms and codes:  
Each medium has a set of norms that rule its operations. As counterpart to its 
generalized and symbolic character, every medium is institutionally anchored in its subsystem 
by norms. Media have 'meaning-specificity' referring to these norms, and they perform 
effectively only within their subsystems. In the case of money, for example, there are many 
exchanges that can be regulated by it, but there are also several that cannot. The codes of the 
media represent the institutional mechanisms that make their operations functionally adequate 
in differentiated contexts. 
2.  Circulation:  
Media can move both between actors inside the subsystem and beyond the system's 
boundaries (double-exchanges). T. Parsons developed the theory of generalized symbolic 
media in the mid-1960s to tackle, theoretically and historically, the issue of differentiation. 
According to him, the interchange media are denned as resources oriented to exchange 
processes between the subsystems of the social system. Starting with money, Parsons argues 
that the remaining media (power, influence, and value-commitments) have a set of 
characteristics denned as common properties for all media. After this first formulation, 
contemporary theorists such as Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas have developed and 
modified the Parsonian theory: Luhmann rejects the idea of interchange and proposes the use 
of communication; Habermas distinguishes between steering and communication media. In all 
three cases, the focus of the theory is on the characterization of the strongest dynamics of 
social co-ordination present in differentiated societies. A major result of these developments 
is the inclusion of new dimensions on which to conceive the properties of media, not only 
those of money but also language. Beyond differences, then, it is proposed that there is only 
one theory of generalized symbolic media’ (Chernilo 2006). 
 
 
11.  CONCLUSION 
 
Gould argues for the contemporary relevance of Parsons's early writings precisely 
because he believes that Parsons provided an effective critique of orthodox economic 
categories, writing: in our current situation, where economists are seeking to apply utilitarian 
models to everything . . . where utilitarian rational-choice models seem once again to be 
making inroads into the heart of sociology and where methodological empiricism is stronger 
than ever, it is well to read Parsons's fifty-year-old demolition of those very same points of 
view. (1989: 649; see also Alexander 1984). for Gould, ‘Parsons’ work provides the most 
sophisticated economic sociology available. He enunciated a conceptual framework within 
which it is possible to both reconceptualize microeconomic theory and to draw on 
macroeconomic theory in the formulation of a viable macrosociology’ (1991: 91). 
One should agree with this assessment, except that it ignores a number of flaws intrinsic 
to his approach. Nearly all of them have methodological roots, i.e. lie in Parsons’ deductive 
and in effect counter empirical approach and the resulting features of his models and 
paradigmas, which, in turn, underlie many inconsistencies and misinpretations in his 
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treatment of actual economies. In this sense one could say that in Parsons’ case epistemology 
dominates ontology. This scornful attitude toward reality is an ingredient of Parsonian legacy 
to the same extent as his undeniable and often underrated accomplishments of his economic 
sociology.  
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